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• In 1961, the Royal Commission on Banking and
Finance (the Porter Commission) was established
to investigate the roles and responsibilities of the
Bank of Canada. Based on submissions from the
Bank, the Commission favoured a credit-
conditions approach as the most appropriate way
for conceiving of the structure of monetary policy.
• As part of a group of macro and monetary
economists from across the country advising the
Porter Commission  in 1962, John Helliwell
participated in the surveys of and interviews within
large corporations to determine the effect of
monetary policy on them. In this ﬁrst encounter
with the Bank he learned much about the
workings of the Canadian economy and met many
of those who would inﬂuence the Bank’s direction.
• The Porter Commission promoted the Bank’s
preparedness to deal with future monetary policy
research, encouraging the use of fellowships to
attract researchers and publication of the Bank’s
research and statistical work with the aim of
improving Canadian monetary and ﬁnancial
information.
• From 1965 on, the Bank began to develop a
quantitative research capacity. Helliwell and his
colleagues worked on the construction of an
econometric model of Canada—RDX1, followed in
rapid succession by RDX2.
• On its completion in 1971, RDX2 was drawn
immediately into the policy arena with the Nixon
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shocks, the end of the Bretton Woods system, and the
oil-price shocks of 1973. Bank researchers were giving
papers at meetings of the Econometrics Society
around the world, and the Bank  of Canada was on
its way to operating in the front ranks of the
world’s evidence-based policy research institutions.
e ﬁrst met in 1962. Although we were
both still in our 20s, she was, from my
vantage point, a serious older person,
although not what you would think of as
a bluestocking intellectual. When she was approach-
ing the age of 30, her parents saw ﬁt to send her out
for career counselling, and thus established, in late
1961, the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance
(the Porter Commission) to do the job. Perhaps you
are already wondering, in this age when gender is
negotiable, how I am able to ascribe femininity where
the legislation did not, and when it could still be said
that “the primary qualities of good Board members
should be intelligence, wisdom and good judgement.
We believe these can best be found by choosing highly
qualiﬁed men from varied backgrounds and experi-
ence” (Porter Commission, 548). First, there are her
strong family links to the Old Lady of Threadneedle
Street, established at the time of the Macmillan Report
in 1933, and continued by several of the witnesses
called before the Porter Commission. This assumption
of femininity was confirmed when I was first employed
in the Research Department of the Bank, in the fall of
1965, assigned to build a structural model of the foreign
exchange market.1 To gain better insights into the
workings of the market, I spent an afternoon in the
interbank foreign exchange trading room in Montréal.
1.  The exchange rate was determined at the intersecting point of separately
identiﬁed and estimated private and ofﬁcial net excess-demand equations for
foreign exchange (Helliwell 1969).
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A fairly lively session was ended by “she’s in for 50”
(units of 100,000 $US), and there was no doubt about
who “she” was. That settled the gender question for
me once and for all, but it is getting ahead of the
story.
When she was approaching the age of
30, her parents saw ﬁt to send her out
for career counselling, and thus
established, in late 1961, the Royal
Commission on Banking and Finance
(the Porter Commission) to do the
job.
For this history,2 the important parts of the Porter
Commission relate to what it heard and what it said
about the research base for monetary policy. The
basis for the Commission’s approach was provided
by the Bank’s own submissions (Bank of Canada 1962).
The only echo there of the preceding Coyne Affair is
Governor Rasminsky’s communiqué of 1 August 1961
(Appendixto Submission 2,23–24),which contains his
view that “in the ordinary course of events he believed
that the Bank of Canada had the responsibility for
monetary policy, but that if the government disap-
proved of that policy it had the right and responsi-
bility to direct the Bank as to the policy which was to
be followed” (Porter Commission, 540). He subse-
quently made clear, as have his successors, that if he
were to receive such a directive, he would immedi-
ately resign. As one might have guessed, there has
never been a directive issued.
The main substance of the Bank’s submissions relate
to what they and the Porter Commission described as
the “credit conditions approach to monetary policy.”
The Porter Commission was preceded by the Radcliffe
Report in the United Kingdom and the Commission
on Money and Credit in the United States, and perhaps
partly for that reason was able to tell a more complete
and coherent story about the objectives, structure, and
constraints of monetary policy. Credit conditions are
“reﬂected in the availability of credit as well as in the
2. In revising the paper for publication, I have been much aided by conﬁrma-
tions, amendments, and corrections kindly provided by Fred Gorbet, George
Post, and Ian Stewart.
effective yields obtainable on financial assets of various
kinds” (Bank of Canada 1962, 11). The Bank submis-
sions were clear that credit conditions were to be
thought of as endogenous variables influenced by
the structure of ﬁnancial markets, by changes in the
demand for goods and services, and of course, by
Bank policies, operating principally through variations
in cash reserves (Bank of Canada 1962, 28). Monetary
policy was seen as part of an overall mix of fiscal,
monetary, and debt-management policies appropriate
to “the degree of utilization of the nation’s productive
capacity and labour supply, the degree of pressure on
price levels, and the state of its balance of payments”
(Bank of Canada 1962, 9).
The credit-conditions approach was in turn adopted
by the Porter Commission, both as a basis for its survey
and other empirical work on the effects of monetary
policy on expenditures (Porter Commission, Chapter 21,
plus Appendix volume), and as the most appropriate
way for conceiving of the structure of monetary policy.
The cost and availability of credit both mattered, as
did the term structure of interest rates. It should be no
surprise that debt management merited both a sepa-
rate submission (Submission 4), and a Porter Commis-
sion research study by Jacques Parizeau so soon after
the Conversion Loan of 1958, which was one of the
few debt-maturity increases large enough to have
had macroeconomic consequences.3
The Porter Commission assembled in 1962 an impres-
sive fraction of the country’s macro and monetary
economists. By one of those lucky breaks that optimists
assume in the same way that economists often assume
perfect information, I was invited along as a young
spear carrier in the wake of the University of British
Columbia’s John Young, one of the assistant directors
of research (with Don Daly and the Bank’s Bob John-
stone) under Research Director Bill Hood, then at the
University of Toronto. Harry Johnson, oscillating
between Chicago and the London School of Economics,
spent the summer in the Porter Commission’s ofﬁces
(in Toronto at Yonge and St. Clair) producing with
John Winder an early econometric analysis of monetary
policy lags. Grant Reuber of the University of Western
Ontario was there doing his pioneering estimation of
monetary policy reaction functions (Reuber 1964),
later followed up in the Bank’s own RDX models,
many years before they became known as Taylor
rules.
3.  As subsequently revealed by simulations of RDX2 (Helliwell, Christoﬁdes,
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Ron Shearer worked on the current account, learning
in the process that the gnomes of Zurich were in fact
the treasurers of importing and exporting firms chang-
ingtheir foreign exchange purchase and sales patterns
in fundamental ways when times were uncertain
(Porter Commission 298–99; Young and Helliwell 1964,
Chapter 11). And times they were indeed uncertain,
as on 2 May 1962, Canada ended its 11-year period of
floating exchange rates much as it had begun, as a
means of dealing with uncertainty. Canada had opted
for a ﬂexible exchange rate because ofﬁcials were una-
ble to ﬁnd a ﬁxed rate that would settle the markets.
At the end, in early 1962, at least as I heard the story,
the Minister of Finance wanted assurance that, if the
rate was left to ﬂoat freely (reserves were ﬂowing out
fast in April as the government tried informally to hold
the rate at 95 cents U.S. per Canadian dollar), it would
not drop below 90 cents. Officials could not provide
that assurance, even though they believed the equilib-
rium was well above that rate, so it was decided to peg
the rate. And 92.5 cents was apparently chosen as the
simple average of the 95 cents they had been defending
and the 90 cents no one wanted to breach.
The prevalence of rules of thumb for
capital-spending decisions prepared
us for the subsequently perennial
ﬁnding that a highly smoothed cost of
funds always dominates more
immediate measures of interest rates
in econometric estimates of business
ﬁxed-capital expenditures.
The main empirical work of the Porter Commission,
under the direction of John Young, was a large mail
and interview survey of the effects of monetary policy
oncorporations.Byincludinginterviewswithpresidents
and treasurers of the largest corporations in the country,
it was possible to cover directly about half of the coun-
try’s business-capital spending, and the Dominion
Bureau of Statistics managed stratiﬁed sampling of
the rest. There were critics of the interview approach
to untangling complex decisions, but texture gained
thereby was important. The prevalence of rules of
thumb for capital-spending decisions prepared us
for the subsequently perennial ﬁnding that a highly
smoothed cost of funds always dominates more
immediate measures of interest rates in econometric
estimates of business ﬁxed-capital expenditures. And
it was also easy for us to see, especially from the expe-
riences of the smaller firms, how tightness in bank
lending fed through pretty quickly to inventory
squeezes. Most helpful of all, getting back to the
uncertain times, was the fact that there were two periods
of tight money in recent management memory, 1956 to
1957 and 1959, and even as the Porter Commission
questionnaire was being prepared there came the for-
eign exchange crisis of May 1962, accompanied by a
striking, if short-lived, bout of tight money.
The survey and interviews took us everywhere, and
thereby I got to meet John Young’s Ottawa friends:
Gerry Bouey, then Chief of the Bank’s Research
Department of 72 persons (including library and
clerical support staff) lodged in the wooden temporary
building on Sparks Street, and Simon Reisman, then
in the Department of Finance. It was by this route
that I was first introduced to the young woman of
Wellington Street, as well as indirectly through the
Bank’s Bob Johnstone, and later Al McKay, working
for the Porter Commission.
I have described the Bank’s credit-conditions approach
to monetary policy as having a big impact on the Porter
Commission approach and conclusions. This approach
has stood the test of time remarkably well, being fully
consonant with what I take to be the forefront of current
research on the effects of monetary policy. In return,
the Porter Commission asked how the Bank might be
better prepared for dealing with future monetary policy
and research. They took the position that the growth
in research training and tools would require expansion
of the Bank’s small-scale use of outsiders on summer
projectsandtemporaryassignments.They“mightcreate
occasional fellowships to encourage studies of ﬁnan-
cial markets and policy of value to the Bank” (Porter
Commission, 552). That part is now in welcome opera-
tion, although with a 40–year lag that would have
looked long even to Harry Johnson and John Winder.
The Porter Commission also approved the Governor’s
suggestion that the Bank might undertake more econo-
metric and other work on the impact of monetary
policy on spending decisions and hoped (552) “that
the Bank will not hesitate to publish more of its own
research and statistical work as part of a continuing
program designed to improve Canadian monetary
and ﬁnancial information.”
So when she reached 30 in the mid-60s, when the young
were being advised “never to trust anyone over 30,”
the Bank started to develop a quantitative research
capacity. George Post had already been brought in34 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
circumstances compare with where one started, and
with one’s expectations of what is feasible. We were
happy with our lot, and with our progress.
The ﬁrst model was a Meade-Mundell-Fleming open-
economy affair with a supply side based on an expec-
tations-adjusted Phillips curve, detailed modelling of
the housing and mortgage markets, and a monetary
policy reaction function for the short-term interest
rate.5 Even George Freeman, the management enthu-
siast for our modelling efforts, thought that we might
in this case be going too far: “How could it be possible
to reduce the complex art of Bank decision-making to
a simple equation?” We researchers argued that such
decisions were probably systematic, in which case an
equationmightestablishthekeyhistoricaldeterminants.
Or perhaps they were just random, in which case
nothing would turn up, so why not let the chips fall
where they may? We compromised by carrying on as
planned, and reducing the possibility of potentially
embarrassing commentary by simply including the
reaction function in the model under the generic label-
ling of “short-term interest rate equation.” If the Bank
had been more adventurous, might the results have
been Rasminsky instead of Taylor rules? With prices
quasi-ﬁxed in the short run and ﬂexible in the longer
term, the model offered short-term policy trade-offs
that disappeared in the longer term (as depicted in
Helliwell, Ofﬁcer, Shapiro, and Stewart 1969).
5. We did not even consider using the perfectly mobile capital version of the
model so often used in later theoretical work, since it was then, as now,
importantly at odds with the data.
Wellington Street (c. 1963). (Photo courtesy of the Bank of Canada Archives,
PC 300.5-236)
with his newly minted PhD in the econometrics of
investment, and I turned up in the fall of 1965 on a
back-and-forth sharing with Nuffield College, Oxford.4
In early 1966, Ian Stewart was brought in from Dart-
mouth to be the full-time Bank leader of modelling,
and Larry Ofﬁcer and Harold Shapiro were brought in
as academic consultants. All three of them had con-
structed econometric models of Canada for their PhD
theses; George Post was spearheading the development
of a computerized data bank; and Mike McCracken
wasdevelopingeconometricsoftwareattheEconomic
Council of Canada. The first Bank modelling was
started in the summer of 1966, and by the following
summer, boxes of computer cards were sent off every
night by bus to the Université de Montréal computer
centre, to be returned the following morning with the
ﬁrst mis-punched card turned upright in the box. All
of this was taking place in the building seen immedi-
ately to the left of the Bank, shown in the photo
taken from the far side of Wellington Street. Model-
ling teams were sometimes sent off to spend the night
at the Université de Montréal computing centre to
increase the number of daily turnarounds. It was a
time when it really paid to follow the old carpenter’s
adage, so often ignored when computing is too easy,
to “measure twice and cut once.”
The ﬁrst model was a Meade-
Mundell-Fleming open-economy
affair with a supply side based on an
expectations-adjusted Phillips curve,
detailed modelling of the housing and
mortgage markets, and a monetary
policy reaction function for the short-
term interest rate.
Progress really speeded up when the Bank acquired
a terminal connected by long-distance modem to a
university computer in Salt Lake City. It was pretty
hard even then to send a full deck of cards without a
line failure, and the late-night teams needed to be
fuelled by large tins of cookies. But well-being is eval-
uated, I have learned since, by how one’s current
4. George Post reminds me that the stage was well set for us by the quantita-
tive research already being done at the Bank by Peter Cornell, Bernie Drabble,
Dave McQueen, and others.35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
The model was initially named HOSS, after the initials
of the main contributors, with attendant horseplay
about what was needed to make HOSS run. Something
more formal was needed if the model was to be a ﬂag-
ship for the increasingly sophisticated 30-something
woman of Wellington Street. Calling the model RD for
Research Department sounded like too much of a com-
mitment to Senior Deputy Governor Robert Beattie,
who thought RDX would better reflect the experimen-
tal nature of this research. So it was called RDX1,
before we could be reminded by Paul Bradley, origi-
nally a chemical engineer, that RDX was already the
name of an explosive. When it came time to publish a
series of model papers in 1969, fulfilling the commit-
ment to make Bank research available to researchers
outside the Bank, the Deputy Governor dropped the
other shoe: “Isn’t it premature to publish a model
which is still in the experimental phase?” But
George Freeman prevailed, and the Bank of Canada
Staff Research Studies series was born.6
RDX2 was the ﬁrst, and remains
perhaps the only, model to have an
integrated hierarchy of factor
demands (including hours and
intensity of use) based on their
relative speeds and costs of
adjustment.
RDX1 was not yet in print by the time RDX2 was under
construction. The original conception had been to
move from the aggregate model RDX1 to a sectoral
RDX2, and much industrial-level modelling had been
put in train. However, industrial disaggregation would
have starkly limited the development of a fuller and
tighter integration of the supply side of the economy,
of mutually consistent short- and long-term dynamic
properties, of an integrated ﬁnancial system, and of
fuller and more integrated linkages with other econo-
mies. Seen in those terms, the choice was easy. The
aggregate business sector became the core of the pri-
6. The ﬁrst seven Bank of Canada Staff Research Studies described the RDX
models and their supporting research. The Staff Research Studies series, and
the contemporaneous creation of the Bank of Canada Review, put into effect the
Bank’s commitment to enlarging and opening the national capacity for quan-
titative macroeconomic research.
vate sector in RDX2, with factor-demand equations
consistently derived from hierarchical modelling of
cost-minimizing behaviour. The same aggregate ﬁrm
was used as the basis for a congruent set of equations
modelling price-setting, short-term adjustment of
employment and average hours, and factor-utilization
(or, equivalently, inventory-accumulation/decumula-
tion) responses to unanticipated changes in demand
or profitability. RDX2 was the first, and remains perhaps
the only, model to have an integrated hierarchy of fac-
tor demands (including hours and intensity of use)
based on their relative speeds and costs of adjustment.
Both RDX1 and RDX2 differed from previous models in
their detailed modelling of the government sector,
with separate treatment of the main expenditure and
revenue components for both federal and provincial
(and municipal) governments. The explicit treatment
of the demand-side and policy forces governing the
evolution of fiscal balances, spearheaded by Fred
Gorbet’s research for his PhD thesis, permitted the
behaviour of automatic stabilizers to be studied more
realistically than previously, contingent on the model’s
inherent dynamic structure, always the hardest part to
pin down (Helliwell and Gorbet 1971).
While the real side was based on the emerging literature
on consistent modelling of output supply and factor
demands,thelinksbetweenthefinancialandrealsectors
were inspired by Tobin’s (1969) general-equilibrium
approach to monetary theory. Fuelled by the innovative
portfolio modelling of Gordon Sparks (including
measures of portfolio disequilibrium used for model-
ling the effects of credit availability on investment
spending), RDX2 was the ﬁrst and probably only full-
scale embodiment of Tobin’s q theory of investment
and of the supply price of capital (both described in
Tobin 1969), with the latter driven by prices in both
bond and equity markets. The supply price of capital
was deﬁned in both nominal and real terms, differing
by the endogenous expected rate of change of the con-
sumer price index, with the expectations process
derived from modelling the relative demands for debt
and equity.
Development of matching book and market values of
the business-capital stock took a lot of work, as did
consistent measurement and modelling of the domes-
tic and foreign-ownership ratios that were needed for
the explanation of international flows of capital services.
We should probably have automated these data-assem-
blyprocesses to a greater extent in the ﬁrst instance, as
they proved difﬁcult to maintain in later years as staff
turned over.36 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
RDX2 was designed for international linkage on four
major fronts: trade in goods and services, direct and
portfolio capital movements, migration, and exchange
rate determination. By the time RDX2 was released
to the world in 1971, Canada was back on a flexible
exchange rate system, and we were scrambling to
make RDX2 equally usable under ﬁxed and ﬂexible
exchange rates (Helliwell and Maxwell 1972). Recog-
nizing the large share of trade and capital market lin-
ages with the United States, and taking advantage of a
somewhat similar (but much more closed) MPS model
of the United States then under construction,7 all
Canadian ﬂows of goods, services, capital, and people
were split between US and the rest of the world
(ROW). The US ﬂows were then linked to variables
endogenous to the MPS model of the United States,
and the ROW ﬂows linked to relevant aggregates of
ROW variables. When I was at the Bank in 2003–2004, I
politely (I hope) bemoaned the fact that the Bank now
runs, in different departments, separately conceived
U.S. and Canadian models without explicit linkage.
Some things are easier when research groups are
smaller.
With the completion of RDX2 in 1971, the Bank’s blue-
stocking conversion was complete, and papers were
being given at the world and regional congresses of
the Econometric Society in Australia, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The RDX
team relied heavily on effective combination of full-
time researchers, part-timers, and student assistants,
some of them economists whose later careers included
a Nobel Prize, presidencies of major universities, and
many federal appointments  at the deputy minister
level, as well as, of course, senior Bank of Canada
management.8 Collaborations with other central bank
modelling teams were developing apace, and Project
7.  The model was known under different names, e.g., MPS for Michigan,
Penn, and the U.S. Social Sciences Research Council; and MIT-Fed, for MIT and
the Federal Reserve Board. It became the Federal Reserve Board’s macro-
econometric workhorse.
8. Fred Gorbet adds: “My major comment is that you are missing what to
my mind is one of the most signiﬁcant contributions the Bank made through
its pioneering modelling efforts, and that was serving as a centre for the crea-
tion of intellectual capital that later became deployed in public policy-making
through the transfer through the Bank and into government of people like
George, Ian, myself, and a host of bright young researchers from Quebec, par-
ticularly, who were attracted by the intellectual rigour of the research being
done at the Bank and who have gone back to very senior positions in the
Quebec public service. Michel Caron, Gilles Godbout, Jean-Guy Turcotte,
Jean St. Gelais, and Henri Paul Rousseau are a few of the names that come
to mind immediately. This is a very important public good that the Bank's
pioneering efforts created.” I agree with him.
The Bank was very farsighted in hiring people like me, who had not yet
completed their PhD dissertations, and giving them time, space, and the
support (intellectually as well as otherwise) to do so.
Link was just getting started. The RDX2–MPS bilateral
linkage was not part of the forecasting structure of
Project Link,9 but was included because it was the
only international modelling project that extended
linkage beyond goods into services, direct investment,
portfolio flows, and exchange rate determination,
directions that others were keen to travel when data
and modelling resources permitted.
By the time RDX2 was completed in
1971, the Bank’s bluestocking
conversion was complete.
The Bank thus went in a very few years from ﬂapper
to serious bluestocking. Especially because this was
done with the active involvement of university-based
researchers, this took the Bank and its research into
the public arena in ways that even now seem pretty
adventurous. I spent 1970 full time at the Bank, paid
for by a Killam Fellowship from the Canada Council,
taking days off to be an expert adviser to the House
of Commons Finance Committee, then studying tax
reform. We even developed within the Bank, and sub-
sequently published, a stochastic general-equilibrium
model (Helliwell 1968) of the macroeconomic implica-
tions of the highly contentious tax-reform proposals of
the Royal Commission on Taxation. Gerry Bouey and
George Freeman took the progressive view that it
should be possible to keep the Bank’s reputation and
independence unsullied by the other involvements of
its part-time researchers, and their optimism seems to
have been justiﬁed.
Once RDX2 became operational, it was drawn into the
policy arena pretty quickly. Less than a month after
the Nixon shock of 15 August 1971, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston held its annual conference, this one
fortuitously focused on financial relationships between
Canada and the United States. Governor Brimmer of
the Fed was given the unenviable job of defending the
application to Canada of import surcharges designed
to convince other countries to revalue their exchange
9.  The ﬁrst major world meeting of Project Link, under the direction of
Lawrence Klein, was held in Hakone, Japan, in 1969. Stephen Goldfeld (1974,
279), reported, I am sure on good information from Ian Stewart, that RDX2
alone had more computer code than all of the national models of Project Link
put together. The national models used in the ﬁrst years of Project Link are
described in Ball (1973), which also includes a chapter on the RDX2-MPS bilat-
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rates (Brimmer 1971). Since Canada had already been
back on a floating exchange rate for a year by then,
and the Canadian dollar had already been revalued by
the market, the Canadians present, including Deputy
Governor Bill Lawson and George Post, were inclined
to cry foul. Round-the-clock work by Ian Stewart had
generated RDX2 simulation results (Helliwell 1971)
showing that Governor Brimmer was wrong to have
expected the 1970 revaluation of the Canadian dollar
to have produced more immediate effects on the bilat-
eral current account. The quality of the Canadian evi-
dence in response far exceeded that underlying the
original policy and its defence. Participants from both
countries were more convinced by the solidly estab-
lished research base for the Canadian case, and the
ability to produce the simulated bilateral current and
capital account consequences on demand. RDX2
appeared at two subsequent Boston Fed conferences.
The ﬁrst, on international aspects of stabilization poli-
cies, in 1974, was a natural place to show how the
bilateral transmission of monetary and ﬁscal policies
was influenced by alternative ways of modelling
trade, capital movements, exchange rates, and migra-
tion. While the qualitative results were regarded as
useful, and endogenous migration proved a more
important channel than many would have expected,
Stephen Goldfeld noted that much depended on
model dynamics, especially in the MPS model, that
were difficult to pin down with either firm theory or
strong evidence. This, in my view, was the weakest
link of the large quarterly models, with or without
endogenous expectations; relatively small changes in
specification could lead to quite large changes in
dynamic responses, even if the longer-term equilib-
rium properties are pinned down by the appropriate
restrictions. This inability to discriminate conclusively
among alternative short-term adjustment paths is part
of what led many subsequent modellers, both inside
and outside the Bank, to rely more heavily on annual
data, and to impose more explicitly forward-looking
expectations structures when and where these are also
consistent with the data.
Almost from the time of RDX2’s birth, and of the Nixon
shock that marked the beginning of the end of the
Bretton Woods system, commodity prices, including
most importantly, the price of oil, had begun their
upward spiral that would soon lead, spurred by the
Arab-Isreali War, to a trebling of world oil prices in
1973–1974. The challenge for modellers, and for mone-
tary authorities, was whether to treat this as a price-
level shock to be accommodated or something that
needed to be offset by drops in other nominal prices
so as to keep the overall price level stable. On average,
the central banks of the world treated the shock as a
one-off level shock and were prepared to provide
monetary accommodation to partially cushion the
immediate effects on aggregate output and employ-
ment, hoping that wages would not start an upward
spiral. It was not as common then as it is now to make
use of  price indexes with the more volatile components
removed and to stake out a middle ground that had
some potential for accommodating the oil-price-level
effects while assuring those setting wages and prices
that non-energy inﬂation would not accelerate.
There was always bound to be some stagﬂation in the
train of the oil-price increases; the issue related to how
to manage monetary policies, and, most importantly,
expectations of monetary policy. In retrospect, the ﬁrst
oil shocks should have been accommodated less fully.
Once inﬂation rates started to approach double digits,
people forming expectations started to change gears
(tofollowtheterminologyintroducedbyJohnFlemming
in 1976), altering their emphasis ﬁrst from the price
level to the rate of inﬂation, and then to the rate of
change of the rate of inﬂation.
The stagﬂation of the 1970s inspired the Boston Fed to
hold their 1978 Edgartown conference, entitled “After
the Phillips Curve: Persistence of High Inflation and
HighUnemployment.”Thiswastheconferencewhere
Lucas and Sargent (1978, 50) made their assertion
“that modern macroeconomic models are of no value
in guiding policy, and that this condition will not be
remedied by modifications along any line which is
currently being pursued.” Challenged by Ben Friedman
to state exactly where the predictions of macroeco-
nomic models had been “wildly incorrect,” they replied
that, in 1970, leading models had suggested that 4 per
cent growth could be accompanied by 4 per cent inﬂa-
tion. To an evidence-based researcher like me, it was
an eye-opener that comparing ceteris paribus model
properties to a shock-ridden period of history would
constitute grounds for dismembering an entire line of
empirically based research. My assignment for the
conference, as the discussant for Lawrence Klein’s
paper, was to assess the extent to which the Project
Link national models had in fact been able to forecast,
starting in 1973, the stagflation between 1974 and 1976.
They had all predicted stagflation, even if less than
that which had actually occurred. All of the models
were capable of capturing the broad stagflationary
consequences of a supply-side shock, although at that
time there was still little empirical basis to permit the
modelling of gear-changing inﬂationary expectations.
I concluded that the models all needed work on the38 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
modelling of inflation expectations, and many also
needed a supply-side better equipped to deal with oil-
price changes. But I had certainly found no evidence
to support what Lucas and Sargent had been saying in
the previous session.
Parallel cost-beneﬁt modelling soon
showed that the presumed immediate
needfor frontierenergyresources was
a ﬁction.
What was even more surprising to me was that the
equilibrium real-business-cycle approach Lucas and
Sargent offered as their preferred alternative was to be
based not on estimation and formal testing of one
structure against another, but on whether a calibrated
version of their theoretical model could be used to
derive distributions of endogenous variables that
looked something like the actual distributions. This
seemed a very unsatisfactory way for evidence-based
social science to operate. When I eventually realized
that the production core of the real business-cycle-
model was nested within the RXD2 supply-side frame-
work, it was then easy to do nested hypothesis testing,
and to show at remarkably high levels of signiﬁcance
that the so-called “Solow residuals” taken to represent
exogenous changes in technology in fact contained the
largest part of the variance of output, easily explicable
within the RDX2 factor-utilization framework (Helliwell
1986).
The Bank was approaching 40 during the aftermath of
the first oil-price shock. Canada was partially sheltered
by a flexible exchange rate, but faced the excise-tax
features of oil-price increases. The federal government
responded with a temporary price freeze on domesti-
cally produced oil, a process that took several years to
unravel. Canadian oil and gas exports were taxed and
restricted, and the National Energy Board, provincial
and federal governments, and the oil and gas industry
were united in the view that, despite the price increases,
the production curves for oil and gas were on a down-
ward slope that made gas from the Mackenzie Valley
Pipeline essential to meet domestic needs by 1980.
Driven by student interest in modelling the macroeco-
nomic effects of such a large project, a pipeline sector
was developed at the University of British Columbia
for RDX2, and the results entered the public policy arena
pretty quickly. The Bank then really needed to rely on
its policy, adopted earlier by Gerry Bouey, of a clear
separation between Bank and non-Bank uses of Bank
research and models. Just as well, because parallel
cost-benefit modelling soon showed that the presumed
immediate need for frontier energy resources was a
ﬁction. This pitted a few academic scribblers (Pearse
1974) with RDX2 in their toolkits against the National
Energy Board and the vast weight of government and
industry opinion.
I marvelled then, and often since, that the trust and
mutual respect among Bank and non-Bank collaborators
was such that the modelling co-operation proceeded
unimpeded for the whole decade of the 1970s. I have
since learned, in the course of research into the deter-
minants of well-being, that such trust not only fosters
good research and policy-making, but also increases
the happiness of all concerned. This makes it that
mucheasiertobuildandmaintaintheintellectualcapital
required to keep the Bank at the forefront of macro-
economic research. The growing size and maturity of
the Bank’s internal research teams meant that there
was less need for active outside leadership. The
woman of Wellington Street was by now a freestand-
ing bluestocking able to recruit with the best of uni-
versities, to offer challenging research careers, and to
operate in the front ranks of the world’s evidence-
based policy research institutions.39 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2005–2006
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